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a b s t r a c t
This paper describes a decision model for managing the movement of building occupants during ﬁre
emergencies. Currently available guidance from standard practice, egress modeling, codes and the re-
search literature, is too general to provide much help to persons charged with the responsibility of where
groups of occupants should be located given a ﬁre scenario. The occupant movement decision model
described in the paper uses three basic yes–no questions to divide building occupants into groups during
a ﬁre emergency. For any particular group, the decision model recommends one of two basic actions:
(1) people remain where they are already located; or, (2) people relocate to a safer area in or outside the
building, including the means by which they should travel to the new recommended location. The model
speciﬁes informational inputs that are used to decide which strategies are best used for which occupant
groups—both in planning the emergency and for maintaining the situation awareness needed to adapt
the plan when situations evolve in unexpected ways. By clearly determining which occupants should use
which strategies, the model yields more effectively tailored strategies than those commonly prescribed
for building-wide strategies of full and phased building evacuations, partial building evacuations, in-
building relocations, and sheltering-in-place.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Persons responsible for managing a ﬁre emergency may lack a
clear understanding of how they should move occupants in re-
sponse to a ﬁre given the ﬁre protection features of a building and
the capabilities of its occupants. This paper describes an occupant
movement1 decision model intended to assist those people. The
normative decision model2 described here is used ﬁrst, to divide
building occupants into groups, and, second, to recommend an
appropriate protection strategy for each group. Each group is
provided with a recommendation to either remain in their present
location or to move to a safer location. If people are asked to move,
then the means (i.e., routes and assistance) by which they are
expected to travel to the safer location can be provided. While the
decision model is primarily intended for persons who will direct
the movement of people, it value to ﬁre safety systems designers
(e.g., ﬁre protection engineers and architects) who are expected to
recommend effective egress strategies appropriate to the occupant
capabilities and the physical ﬁre safety and layout features of
speciﬁc buildings.
Occupant movement strategies are often categorized using
schemes similar to the following: [1]
 Simultaneous whole building evacuations. All occupants leave
the building at the same time when they are notiﬁed.
 Phased whole building evacuations. All occupants leave the
building, but in a phased sequence based on the vulnerability of
building occupants.
 Partial building evacuations. All occupants in a certain part of
the building leave.
 Relocating people within a building. Persons in the building
relocate to safer areas.
However, in many large buildings, these approaches are over-
simpliﬁed. A combination of strategies should be recommended to
different groups of occupants depending on the factors discussed
in this paper. For example, in a tall building, persons above and
below the ﬁre zone may be requested to remain where they are
already located and evacuate the building if necessary (defend-in-
place with a partial building evacuation as backup), persons in the
ﬁre zone may be requested to move below or above the ﬁre zone
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1 To avoid confusion, this paper uses the term “occupant movement” because
people may be advised to remain in their present locations or to move to a different
location in the same building. The terms “evacuation” and “egress” are sometimes
used when referring to all movement of people during emergencies, but in many
other contexts these terms imply that people move to the outside of a building.
2 In contrast to descriptive models, a normative “model” is a prescriptive de-
cision model that is used to evaluate alternative solutions to a problem.
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(relocate), and persons with disabilities may be requested to move
to refuge areas to await rescue (relocate, defend-in-place, and
rescue if necessary).
1.1. Some investigations of ﬁres implicate poor managerial decision
making that contributed to large losses of life
Because persons charged with the responsibility of managing a
ﬁre emergency often lack a clear understanding of the logic un-
derlying ﬁre protection features, it is not surprising that they make
mistakes when responding to emergencies. Unfortunately, these
mistakes are rarely revealed because investigations of ﬁres focus
on problems with physical systems—shortcomings in code provi-
sions or maintaining systems mandated by codes. Even when
mistakes are made, they are often attributed to “panic” instead of
attempting to understand the mistaken logic that provided the
erroneous rationale for these mistakes. However, there is evidence
where managerial mistakes contributed to the severity of ﬁre in-
cidents. A high rise ofﬁce building ﬁre in Chicago resulted in
several fatalities attributable in part to errors in managing the
movement of building occupants [2]. Chertkoff and Kushingian [3]
document ﬁres where delayed and poor managerial decision-
making may have contributed to large losses of life. These included
(1) managerial delays in starting an evacuation caused by a fear
that occupants would “panic,” and (2) the unavailability of people
to guide occupants to safe egress routes. Chertkoff and Kushingian
explain that, in addition to poor decision making in response to
ﬁre, building management also failed to understand how pre-
conditions such as highly combustible interiors and convoluted
and blocked egress routes greatly increased the risks if a serious
ﬁre were to occur.
1.2. A simple mental model might improve decision making for the
movement of building occupants in response to ﬁre
Sophisticated education and training would certainly improve
the responses of occupant movement managers, but it seems
unlikely that a great increase in resources will be dedicated to that
purpose. However, a simple mental model3 should help occupant
movement managers avoid mistakes in both planning for and re-
sponding to ﬁre emergencies. Such a mental model might help
people managing the movement of occupants to better under-
stand how strategic responses to ﬁres can take advantage of
building features and to compensate for human limitations under
a range of potential scenarios. The occupant movement decision
model described in this paper serves as a mental model that is
easily understood and recalled with relatively little ﬁre safety
education and training.
1.3. Existing recommendations about managing the operational re-
sponses to ﬁre emergencies are too general
There are references that describe the general issues about
planning to manage responses to ﬁre emergencies. Examples in-
clude the Life Safety Code [4] where detailed recommendations are
available for conducting required life safety assessment in as-
sembly occupancies. Burtles [5] has published a guide based on
the process of business continuity planning. In England and Wales,
occupancy-speciﬁc “ﬁre safety documents” are available online [6].
The Building Owners and Managers Association has published
useful but general guides to emergency planning [7,,8]. Extensive
coverage is available that describes the logic that underlies the
physical design of building features that enable the safe movement
of people [1], but there is little guidance about how physical sys-
tems should be leveraged when making operational decisions
about moving people during ﬁre emergencies.
1.4. Computational models of egress times have limited value in
managerial decision making for occupant movement during a ﬁre
A rich body of research and development deals with the de-
velopment of models that calculate travel times during ﬁre
emergencies. Calculated egress times derived from these evacua-
tion models are used to design egress systems that ensure ade-
quate carrying capacities to evacuate building occupants.
Computational predictions for building evacuation times gen-
erally compare Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) to Available Safe
Egress Time (ASET). Depending on a selected scenario (the design
ﬁre and the numbers, locations and capabilities of building occu-
pants), the margin of safety provided by a building’s physical
features is calculated as the amount of time that available safe
egress time exceeds the required safe egress time. The available
safe egress time is derived from engineering models of ﬁre growth
that measure the amount of time before a space becomes unten-
able, a function of heat, visibility and smoke toxicity [1]. As an
example, ASET for a given space ends when a layer of smoke
descends to a height where building occupants may not survive.
Fire protection engineers widely apply computational egress
models to performance-based design solutions. The ASET/RSET
approach guides the design of physical systems that facilitate the
movement of people in buildings, especially the design of egress
system. Nonetheless, the approach has important limitations.
 Well-managed occupant movement should use a more con-
servative (but very difﬁcult to measure) objective, for example
not to expose people to conditions where they feel their lives
are in immediate jeopardy.
 Older simulation models generally treat people as physical ob-
jects, ignoring their cognitive attributes and lack of information
about available egress routes, both important determinants of
actual behavior. Therefore, these models often calculate optimal
times, assuming that people follow the quickest safe route, and
thereby underestimate actual evacuation times. Beyond the
speeds at which people are expected to move, recent innova-
tions are extending the approach to include the cognitive at-
tributes of people, including pre-evacuation times (i.e., that
amount of time the people take before beginning their move-
ment toward egress routes) and interactions of individuals with
their environments, including egress familiarity, ﬁre hazards,
other people and physical features such as building layouts, and
the visibility of exit signs [9,,10].
 Simulation models have either excluded or been very limited in
their ability to incorporate the variable and adaptive behaviors
of building occupants [9].
 Using computational models to optimize the design of egress
routes often requires a tedious process of comparing various
conﬁgurations, ﬁre scenarios and assumptions about the loca-
tions and capabilities of building occupants. Recent innovations
may provide more efﬁcient computational methods to ﬁnding
the most efﬁcient strategies for moving people [11]. Even if we
assume that entirely valid means to computationally model
optimal occupant movement strategies are forthcoming, realiz-
ing the potential is impossible without some way of conveying this
information to the persons responsible for managing the move-
ment of occupants.
 Central to the concerns addressed in this paper, these compu-
tational models do not include the decision processes of the
3 “Mental models” are simple beliefs that people have about how something
works in the real world. To the degree that mental models accurately represent the
real world, people are less likely to make mistakes.
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very persons responsible for directing the movement of people
during a ﬁre emergency.
1.5. Historic processes have led to changes in occupant movement
strategies
Historically, decisions about how to manage the movement of
building occupants have evolved by a trial-and-error process for
speciﬁc types of occupancies [1]. For example, in response to ﬁres
in health care facilities, building features have evolved that protect
patients in their rooms, a concession to the reality that stafﬁng
levels are often insufﬁcient to quickly relocate more than a few
immediately endangered patients to safer areas. In tall buildings,
building features have evolved that enable relocation of occupants
from only the areas that are most immediately affected by a ﬁre,
hopefully providing exit stairs that are sufﬁciently uncrowded
while not having to dedicate excessive leasable ﬂoor areas to stair
enclosures.4 In large assembly occupancies, tragic ﬁres have led to
increased egress capacity, multiple routes, and requirements that
staff be trained to direct occupants.
Despite the considerable historical improvements, the logic
that underlies the decisions about which occupants should move
where remains obscure to the people who are expected to make
these decisions. Mistakes where staff failed to take advantage of
code-mandated ﬁre protection features have resulted in fatalities
in health care fatalities [12]. Understanding the bases for occupant
movement decisions is important both in planning for ﬁre emer-
gencies and in adapting to situations as they occur during ﬁre
emergencies. Further, understanding the logic for occupant
movement decisions reinforces the critical importance of main-
taining key building features and conducting training drills that
will contribute to the effective movement of occupants during
emergencies.
1.6. Code requirements related to managing the movement of occu-
pants in buildings are not tailored to different groups of occupants
1.6.1. Codes primarily govern the physical attributes of egress
systems
Building codes, both prescriptive and performance-based,
provide detailed requirements for the physical protection of egress
routes. Performance-based design solutions generally require the
use of a computational model (see Section 1.4). A review of code
requirements governing egress is beyond the scope of this paper
and is available elsewhere [1].
1.6.2. Planning requirements provide little guidance about how to
tailor occupant movement to speciﬁc groups and scenarios
Fire and occupancy codes often include very general mandatory
and recommended ﬁre emergency planning requirements, but
they omit details about how plans can best be tailored to the
speciﬁc characteristics of buildings and their occupants. In many
instances, codes simply require the existence of a plan. At a con-
siderable level of detail, the Life Safety Code, NFPA 101 [4], requires
a life safety evaluation for assembly occupants with large numbers
of occupants. While the details are left unspeciﬁed, an annex to
the Life Safety Code includes detailed recommendations for the
types of content that should be included in the analysis. Never-
theless, given the numerous contingencies, the recommendations
understandably lack advice about what occupant movement
strategies are best used in response to which ﬁre scenarios.
Local jurisdictions, typically cities, sometimes have detailed
requirements for emergency planning in certain high-risk occu-
pancies such as tall buildings and large places of assembly. As an
example, New York City has adopted local laws requiring Emer-
gency Actions Plans in tall commercial buildings and large hotels
[13]. These requirements charge a certiﬁed ﬁre/emergency action
plan director with the task of writing an Emergency Action Plan
(EAP), deﬁned as “a written plan which sets forth the circum-
stances and procedures for the sheltering in place, in-building
relocation, partial evacuation or evacuation of building occupants
in response to an emergency.” However, it is important to note
that the plans written to meet these regulations do not address
how ﬁre safety/EAP directors can determine which strategy should
be employed in which circumstances, a problem that this paper
attempts to address.
2. The occupant movement decision model
2.1. The occupant movement decision model has these basic features
This paper presents an analytic tool for understanding which
decisions are appropriate in a speciﬁc building given the evolving
locations of ﬁre hazards and people, along with the limitations of
occupants and the availability of assistance to overcome those
limitations. The model has the following essential features:
 The model is based on a sequence of three yes–no decisions that
the occupant movement manager uses to divide building oc-
cupants into groups. Groups are not deﬁned solely by their lo-
cation in the building in relation to the ﬁre hazard; different
recommendations may be provided to different groups in the
same location based their capabilities and the availability of
help in overcoming their limitations (see Sections 2.4.5 covering
occupant capabilities and Section 2.4.6 covering the availability
of assistance).
 Each group receives a simple recommendation to either remain
where they are presently located or to move to a safer location
using a speciﬁc means (e.g., horizontal compartments, stairs, or
elevators, either with or without assistance from ﬁre ﬁghters or
members of a building emergency response team.)
 The decision model is applied to speciﬁc ﬁre scenarios. The
ways in which occupants are divided into groups depends on
the informational inputs associated with the scenario under
consideration. Informational inputs include both conditions in-
place before an incident begins (for example, building ﬁre
protection features and the likely locations and conditions of
people in the building) and dynamic information that evolves
during a ﬁre incident (i.e., the extent of hazards and changes in
the locations of people and their conditions). Building codes are
generally reactive; the scenarios considered by code writers are
based on unspeciﬁed historical ﬁres that have caused fatalities.
These ﬁres are not described in the code itself, although com-
mentary on code requirements can provide some guidance.
Performance-based requirements in the NFPA Life Safety Code
[4] include a set of ﬁre scenarios that can serve as a starting
point in selecting scenarios appropriate to ﬁre emergency
planning in a particular building.
 The decision model can be used for both planning and for
adapting a response during the ﬁre emergency. After the model
description, which applies to both, there is a separate discussion
(Section 5) about using of the model to adapt to the way that an
emergency develops. The optimal decision for moving a group
may change during a ﬁre emergency. In these circumstances, a
backup strategy is advisable. Occupant movement managers
4 The opinion that people will wait for their turn when evacuating tall build-
ings has been questioned following the World Trade Center attacks on September
11, 2001 [29].
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need to maintain sufﬁcient situation awareness to understand
when a change is desirable. To the extent that occupant move-
ment managers have planned for these contingencies, it is likely
that the transition to a different backup strategy will be
implemented efﬁciently and accepted by building occupants.
The decision model in its entirety is shown in Fig. 2.1.
2.2. Decision number one: which occupants are in danger where
they are located?
This is the ﬁrst decision for an obvious reason; where occu-
pants are safe where they are already located, it is simplest to
request them to stay where they are already located. This also
frees the people managing the movement of people to focus their
attentions on the remaining two decisions. The ﬁrst decision and
its required informational inputs are shown in Fig. 2.2.
2.2.1. Building features that limit the projected locations of hazards
Compartmentation, sprinklers and smoke control are building
ﬁre protection features that are likely to be reliable enough to
allow decision-makers to consider occupants as safe even when
there is a ﬁre in the building—assuming that these features are
maintained to ensure their performance as designed. A careful
assessment of these features is essential to understanding the
expected extent of ﬁre hazards for each selected scenario.
 Compartmentation refers to the use of barriers the limit the
travel of ﬁre hazards (i.e., heat and smoke) from one building
space to another.5
a. Obviously, people are generally safe when they are located in
a different building. In some special situations, codes will
permit connected spaces to be considered as separate build-
ings, but only where extensive building features reliably
prevent a hazard from spreading across the separation be-
tween the “buildings.”
b. Barriers can generally be divided into two categories, vertical
and horizontal. Vertical barriers limit the spread of ﬁre and
smoke from one ﬂoor to another. Where vertical openings are
unprotected against the travel of a ﬁre hazard, none of the
occupants above the ﬁre can be considered safe in their lo-
cations. Horizontal separations limit the spread of ﬁre and
smoke on a single ﬂoor of a building. Where people need to
travel from one side of a horizontal barrier to the other side,
codes may allow the installation of a horizontal exit. Hor-
izontal exits include ﬁre-rated and smoke-resistant doors that
must either remain in a closed position or that automatically
close when either an alarm is activated or smoke is detected
at the location of the doors. Therefore, people who are se-
parated from a ﬁre by a horizontal exit may be considered to
be safe throughout the duration of most ﬁre.
 Automatic suppression, especially sprinkler systems that auto-
matically detect and suppress ﬁres, may prevent the spread of
hazards beyond the area where the ﬁre started.
 Smoke control can be used to remove smoke before occupants
are exposed, increasing the likelihood that occupants can re-
main where they are already located.
A relocation backup strategy may be required in the event of an
unusual severe ﬁre or performance failures in the buildings ﬁre
protection features (see Section 4). Horizontal exits are extensively
used in health care facilities because it is exceedingly difﬁcult to
move patients between ﬂoors using stairs (the use of elevators is
typically prohibited during ﬁre emergencies). They are also com-
mon in large residential buildings so that longer corridors, when
divided by horizontal exits, can be used without exceeding code
requirements for maximum travel distances to an exit.
2.2.2. The number of people in the various locations of the building
Decision-makers need a general idea about both the number of
people and their likely locations in the building. At the onset of an
emergency, the most conservative answer is that there may be
people in any and all occupiable spaces. In some occupancies, the
number of building occupants varies considerably depending on
working hours.
2.2.3. The communication of recommended actions even when peo-
ple are not asked to move
As a generalization, persons assessed as most in danger from
ﬁre hazards need to receive the highest priority in receiving in-
formation about recommended actions. Persons in relatively less
danger may be requested to wait for further instructions that
depend on how the ﬁre emergency is developing. When people
are considered safe in their present locations, they still need to be
instructed to remain where they are already located. For these
reasons, communications should not only provide instructions, but
also a brief explanation about why it is advisable to remain in
place instead of moving [14].
Another imperative reason for communications is because
more than likely occupants will receive cues that may motivate
them to leave areas where they are safe. These include observa-
tions of ﬁre cues such as the odor of smoke, arriving ﬁre ﬁghters
and sightings of other evacuating building occupants. The problem
Fig. 2.1. Occupant movement management decision model.
5 There are many other relevant building features that are also important in
determining the growth of ﬁres, but which are not discussed here. Examples in-
clude the ﬂammability of wall coverings, systems that vent smoke from atriums,
and the fuel load provided by furnishings.
N.E. Groner / Fire Safety Journal 80 (2016) 20–29 23
is compounded by the widespread use of social media that enable
occupants to quickly and easily acquire information from both
inside the building and with persons outside of the building. They
are likely to take actions in the absence of advice from occupant
movement managers, potentially leading them to make mistakes
that endanger themselves by moving to more vulnerable locations
or interfering with the movement of people in greater jeopardy,
for example, by increasing congestion in stairs or by unnecessarily
endangering rescuers.
2.3. Decision number two: are there safer locations?
A “safer” location is relative. In the ﬁrst decision, we asked
whether a group of occupants is very likely to be safe throughout a
ﬁre incident. In buildings that are well-designed for ﬁre safety,
there will always be safer locations in the event that occupants
may not remain safe throughout a ﬁre emergency. The problem for
occupant movement managers is to understand where these safer
areas are located (if any are available) for each particular group of
building occupants. However, occupant movement managers can
inherent building with deﬁciencies (see Section 4.2) or they may
face ﬁres that exceed the scenarios for which the building was
designed. Therefore, occupant movement managers should be
prepared to ask whether safer areas exist. If safer areas are un-
available, then plans to rescue occupants are needed in the event
that these occupants are endangered (Fig. 2.3).
The projected location and extent of the ﬁre hazard. The same
basic considerations as reviewed in the ﬁrst decision apply to this
decision as well. In particular, this requires an assessment as to
whether the paths of travel to a safer location are likely to remain
relatively free of smoke and heat. This will depend on the same
ﬁre protection features of the building considered in Section 2.2.1.
2.3.1. The building features that often provide safer locations than
where people are already located
Exits are primarily intended to move people to safer locations in
the building or outside the building. However, because they are
typically well-protected using ﬁre-resistant barriers and closed
doors, they can also serve as areas that are relatively safer from the
areas that they are leaving. However, exits are rarely re-
commended as the ﬁnal destinations during ﬁre emergencies be-
cause ﬁre hazards can still enter the exits (especially because ﬁre
ﬁghters often use exit stairs to stage their ﬁre suppression activ-
ities, allowing smoke to enter) and because they can become so
crowded in large buildings with high occupancy loads that some
people may be unable to enter the exits or travel rapidly once
inside the exit stairs (see Section 2.4 for a discussion of vertical
and horizontal exits).
Exit discharge refers to the areas outside of a building where the
path of travel will remain free of obstruction and will locate
evacuating occupants to areas where they are safe from ﬁre ha-
zards, will not obstruct ﬁre suppression operations, and may serve
as an assembly area where occupants can be accounted for (also
see Section 2.3.3).
Areas of refuge are spaces inside of building speciﬁcally de-
signed to provide safety during a ﬁre emergency. At a minimum, a
well-designed area of refuge will be separated from surrounding
Fig. 2.3. Decision 2, Are there safer locations?
Fig. 2.2. Decision 1, Which groups of occupants are in danger where they are located?
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areas with ﬁre-rated or smoke-resistant barriers and doors, and
may also include a pressurization system that provides air from
the exterior of the building and impedes smoke from entering the
area, as well as a two-way communication system that connects
persons in the refuge areas with an occupant movement manager.
Areas of refuge are frequently intended for use by persons who are
unable to evacuate unassisted to the outside of a building, gen-
erally because they have disabilities or are patients in a health-
care facilities. In some newer high rise buildings, entire ﬂoors may
constitute an area of refuge [15,,16]. Some buildings have desig-
nated areas of refuge that fail to meet these requirements. These
substandard areas are better considered as areas of rescue assis-
tance where people who wait temporarily until they can be safely
evacuated by ﬁre ﬁghters. As an example, some buildings have
enlarged landings in exit stairs that can accommodate a few
wheelchair users without impeding the progress of other persons
using the exit stairs to relocate to safer areas or the outside of the
building.
2.3.2. Provision for rescue when occupants may not remain safe
When occupants may not remain safe during a ﬁre emergency,
provisions should be made in the event that they must be rescued.
For example, occupants with mobility impairments are a group
that may require assistance to descend the same stairs that other
occupants have used to relocate to safer locations. In many situa-
tions, responding ﬁre ﬁghters will be expected to rescue occu-
pants, so it is important that building managers can identify their
locations and relay this information.
2.3.3. Determination of whether people are safer outside the building
When occupant movement managers determine that occu-
pants should relocate, they need to decide whether they should
recommend another location inside the building or outside the
building (see Fig. 2.4). As a generalization, people are safer outside
of a building where there is a ﬁre. There are exceptions. Fires
outside of buildings or in locations that involve the exterior of the
building can expose occupants to ﬁre and smoke when they exit.
When a ﬁre is located outside the building, smoke often enters the
building leading to the misperception that there is an interior ﬁre.
Someone with poor situation awareness (see Section 4.3) may
order the evacuation of all or part of the building, thinking that
people will be safer outside. An accurate understanding of the
location of the ﬁre is needed to evaluate which areas outside the
building are safer than inside.
An adequate exit discharge and a viable area of assembly are
other considerations. Codes require that occupants be able to re-
locate at a distance sufﬁciently away from the building so that they
are not exposed to hazards and do not interfere with ﬁreﬁghting
operations. For some buildings, it is important to consider the
locations where occupant movement managers want evacuees to
assemble [5], a particular concern where evacuees may be exposed
to very uncomfortable weather.
2.4. Decision number three: are there safe means to relocate to a
safer location?
The decision about whether to move people to a safer location
depends on whether they can be safely moved without exposing
them to hazardous amounts of heat or smoke. Determining the
safety of routes and providing the assistance needed to use those
routes is the most complex of the decisions facing occupant
movement managers (Fig. 2.5).
2.4.1. Stairs
There are two basic types of stairs, “exit” stairs and other less
protected stairs. Exit stairs have two basic features that provide
protection from smoke and ﬁre: (1) the stairs are lined with un-
interrupted ﬁre-rated barriers; and, (2) the doors to the stairs are
ﬁre-rated and have closers that will prevent the doors from re-
maining open during a ﬁre emergency. Once people are inside of
an exit stair, they are better protected than if they remained in
areas that are more easily exposed to the smoke and heat from a
ﬁre. Therefore, exit stairs usually provide a safe means to relocate
people to areas where they are better protected from ﬁre hazards.
Stairs that do not qualify as part of an exit may still be good
means to relocate people, but they are best used only when (1) the
use of an exit stair is potentially hazardous, (2) the stairs are un-
obstructed, (2) they have been examined and found to be rela-
tively free of smoke.
Multistory buildings without any exit stairs are usually either
single or two-family homes or older residential structures. Apart
from single and two-family homes, most buildings will have two
stairs. Some jurisdictions use performance-based design ap-
proaches where a single stair might be allowed as a result of other
design decisions that are considered as providing sufﬁcient pro-
tection. Further, older residential structures may have only a single
“exit” stair, with a ﬁre escape serving as the alternative means to
escape from upper ﬂoors.
In certain buildings, exit stairs may be either smoke enclosures
or pressurized. A smoke enclosure is a stairs where building oc-
cupants enter the stairs by passing through the vestibule. Vents in
the vestibules allow smoke to escape to the outside of the building
before it enters the stairs.
Stairs can also be protected using pressurization. A mechanical
system of fans raises the pressure inside the exit stairs. When the
pressurization system works properly, little of the smoke will
enter the exit stairs. However, in tall buildings, stack effects and
multiple open doors can limit the effectiveness of pressurized
stairs—another reason to maintain good situation awareness (see
Section 4.3) [1].
2.4.2. Protected elevators
For the most part, elevators are not used to evacuate buildings
during ﬁres. Elevators are always taken out of service when smoke
is detected in the vicinity. When elevators are taken out of service
(often called elevator capture or phase I service), they travel to the
ground ﬂoor (or another ﬂoor if smoke is detected on the ground
ﬂoor) where the doors open and the elevator cannot be used by
building occupants. After elevators are taken out of service, they
can still be used by ﬁre ﬁghters using a special key (called ﬁre-
ﬁghter service or phase II operation). Fire ﬁghters may useFig. 2.4. Decision, Are occupants safer outside the building?
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elevators during a ﬁre emergency to move personnel and equip-
ment closer to a ﬁre and to evacuate persons who have been un-
able to evacuate without their assistance—but only after their safe
use has been carefully evaluated.
In recent years, there have been efforts to design elevators so
that they can be used to move people to safer areas even during
ﬁre emergencies [17,,18]. These emergency occupants evacuation
(EOE) elevators, and the lobbies where building occupants would
wait for elevators to arrive, are likely to be pressurized and en-
closed with smoke and ﬁre-resistant barriers. Further, the eleva-
tors would be designed to be taken out of service when smoke is
detected in the lobbies or elevator shafts.
2.4.3. Areas of rescue assistance and rest
In large, and especially very tall, buildings, occupants may be
unable to travel the expected distances without resting in a rela-
tively safe location. The problem is compounded for occupants
with mobility limitations who may be entirely unable to descend
stairs and will need relatively safe locations to await assistance.
Wider landings on stairs serve the purpose, but are typically small
in size. In very tall buildings, entire refuge ﬂoors, or portions of
ﬂoors, are increasingly used for this purpose [15]. These larger
spaces can serve not only as areas of rest, but also as safe areas to
transfer to different exit stairs and to protected elevators. How-
ever, it may still be necessary to rescue occupants in these areas if
ﬁre hazards endanger them as the situation evolves. Therefore, an
effective emergency plan will anticipate this necessity.
2.4.4. Exterior supplemental evacuation equipment
There have been recent innovations that can be used to evac-
uate relatively small numbers of people from upper stories in
buildings to the outside. These devices are chutes and platforms. In
general, building and ﬁre codes do not qualify these systems as
acceptable means to escape. In the United States, these systems
have rarely been installed because of the expense, issues about
safety and reliability, and the inability to quickly move large
numbers of occupants.
2.4.5. Movement performance of occupants
Certain persons are likely to be less capable, or entirely unable,
to move to other locations in the building without assistance.
Occupants may have limitations because of their age (either very
young or old), mobility, sensory and cognitive disabilities, and
temporary “disabilities.” It is important to not categorize persons
with disabilities together regardless of type and severity. In plan-
ning for occupant movement, persons should be encouraged to
participate to the extent that their impairments allow. For more
detailed information, see SFPE [19] or Burtles [5]
 Mobility impairments are the most common limitation that
prevents people from moving in buildings to safer locations. Of
particular importance is the ability to use stairs. While persons
who use wheelchair or other assistive devices have readily ap-
parent disabilities, for many persons with mobility impair-
ments, the limitations are mostly or entirely hidden. Muscu-
loskeletal problems such as back and leg problems and arthritis
may not be easily observed. There are temporary disabilities
such a pregnancy and broken limbs that can prevent the use of
stairs. It is also important to note the distances that people may
have to travel on stairs. People with relatively mild impairments
may be able to negotiate a few ﬂights of stairs without much
difﬁculty, but traversing several ﬂights of stairs can cause ser-
ious risks to the same people.
 Sensory disabilities related to vision and hearing are common
limitations. Sight impairments can make unassisted way-ﬁnd-
ing difﬁcult or impossible in unfamiliar settings. However, blind
persons may have an advantage in familiar settings when
emergency lighting fails and sighted persons navigate egress
routes [20]. Hearing impairments create problems in alerting
and instructing persons.
 Cognitive impairments are important problems, especially in
unfamiliar settings. We typically associate developmental dis-
abilities with cognitive impairments, although this can be
misleading. Well-rehearsed persons with mild levels of re-
tardation often respond more reliably and quickly than other
persons [21]. Age-related cognitive impairments are important
limitations. Young children can easily make mistakes that are
counterintuitive to adults, such as hiding in closets or under
beds. Persons with dementia can become confused and lose
their abilities to navigate and understand instructions during
the stress of a ﬁre emergency. Intoxication from alcohol or drugs
(legal, such as sleeping and pain medications, as well as illegal
drugs) can create various problems. Persons who are intoxi-
cated or medicated can be much slower to accurately assess
danger, and are less likely to awaken in time to take effective
responses. Intense levels of fear can also limit people’s cognitive
performance.
 Sleep is a limitation of great importance. Persons who are asleep
at the onset of a ﬁre emergency are often much slower to re-
spond. As noted above, persons using illegal or prescribed legal
drugs can be much more difﬁcult to wake. Alarm signals may
fail to awaken young children.
2.4.6. Availability of assistance
To the extent that occupants are unlikely to move to safer
Fig. 2.5. Decision 3, Are there safe means to move to a safer location?
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locations without assistance, help should be provided. Help can be
provided by organized and trained building emergency response
teams. In addition to an occupant movement manager, roles for
building emergency response teams can include (1) ﬂoor wardens
or monitors who direct occupants to safer egress routes; (2) per-
sons charged with searching areas to ensure that everyone has left
(assuming that they have been instructed to move to another lo-
cation); (3) elevator monitors who prevent people from using
elevators or, when the building is equipped with protected ele-
vators that can be safely used, direct and reassure occupants that
they should wait for an elevator car; and (4) persons assigned to
help occupants with disabilities.
Instructions in many buildings are provided by a one-way
public address or alarm notiﬁcation systems. Building emergency
response teams are typically required to ensure that broadcasted
messages are understood and to reinforce the feasibility of the
recommended actions when occupants have doubts. Building oc-
cupants may be unfamiliar with the layout of the building, espe-
cially egress routes. This is the likely case not only for visitors, but
also for occupants who have not participated in ﬁre drills designed
to familiarize them with alternative means to travel in the build-
ing. Well-designed messages should use simple language, identify
that the message is from an authorized person, explain the ratio-
nale for the recommended action, and be repeated [19]. Further,
the intelligibility of messages should be assessed to ensure that
they can be understood. However, messages broadcast over public
address systems may lack sufﬁcient information or credibility and
will need to be explained and reinforced.
The building emergency response teammay also be responsible
for assisting persons who are not able or who are unlikely to
evacuate without assistance (see Section 2.4.5). While some
buildings maintain registers of nontransient occupants who are
likely to require assistance, these cannot be relied on to be com-
plete. Apart from the problem of maintaining up-to-date registers,
registers are likely to omit visitors who have limitations, persons
who have temporary disabilities and persons who have not vo-
luntarily included themselves in the register.
Controlled descent devices (most types are often labeled as
“evacuation chairs”) are used to move persons with disabilities or
injuries that prevent them from using stairs. These devices move
persons needing assistance down stairs operated by a single
helper [22,,23]. Persons needing assistance must be transferred to
the chair, an operation that can injure either the occupant or the
operator when poorly executed. Practice in using the devices is
recommended to provide both operators and disabled persons
with the conﬁdence to use them safely. Persons with disabilities
can often provide advice to operators on how they can be most
safely transferred to the devices—a potentially dangerous man-
euver for fragile persons.
3. Delayed movement for persons with critical functions
An important group of persons that have critical responsi-
bilities during a ﬁre emergency may be delayed in their move-
ment. Categories of people in this group may include the
following:
 Building emergency response team members, such as ﬂoor
wardens, typically leave an area after the occupants for which
they are responsible are deemed safe (see Section 2.4.6).
Persons managing occupant movement and monitoring the
status of ﬁre protection systems may remain in a ﬁre command
station to improve the situation awareness of arriving public
safety personnel and to cooperatively continue their activities as
the emergency develops.
 Persons charged with securing key tenant infrastructure may be
delayed from leaving their work stations. Examples include
persons who save working ﬁles and shut down and secure
computer systems. As with building emergency response team
members, facilities managers may be requested to report to the
ﬁre command station to assist ﬁre ﬁghters in understanding and
operating building equipment such as heating, ventilation and
air conditioning (HVAC) systems.
 Persons charged with shutting down key building infra-
structure, such as manufacturing processes and gas supplies.
 Persons charged with removing a list of persons who were in
the building at the time of the emergency. In many buildings, it
is unrealistic to expect an accurate roster of building occupants,
especially visitors. However, some buildings with advanced
security systems have more reliable access control devices that
track when people both enter and leave the building and a
register showing when visitors arrive and leave the premises.
 Persons charged with maintaining access control during the
emergency [5]. These are most likely to be security personnel
who are placed at location of ingress into the building.
People in all of the above categories should be incorporated in
occupant movement planning. Sometimes tenants fail to disclose
the presence of persons with these responsibilities because of
resistance from building managers and ﬁre ﬁghters.
4. Using the occupant movement model to adapt occupant
movement strategies to the way that an emergency develops
4.1. Backup strategies
Backup strategies may be required depending on how well
initial strategies work taking into consideration the locations of
occupants and the projected extent of ﬁre hazards. For example, in
a tall building, persons who have relocated away from the ﬁre
zone may be requested to evacuate the building when smoke from
a ﬁre begins to migrate outside of the ﬁre zone. In many instances,
all occupants will be expected to evacuate the building after oc-
cupants in more danger have already left. Occupant movement
managers should incorporate backup strategies into their plan-
ning, thereby expediting the backup strategies to respond to
evolving ﬁre scenarios. The timely and appropriate use of backup
strategies depends on maintaining good situation awareness (see
Section 4.3).
4.2. Problems with the condition and maintenance of ﬁre protection
features and emergency operations
Ideally, a good emergency plan will allow a timely and appro-
priate response to a ﬁre emergency, but this cannot be guaranteed.
The decision model described in this paper serves two purposes:
(1) given a scenario and the physical attributes of a building,
planning occupant movement in preparation for a ﬁre emergency
can be improved; and (2) making real-time adaptions to the plan
depending on how an actual ﬁre emergency evolves will be more
effective. There are inherent uncertainties in the way that ﬁre
emergencies will evolve—and the more complex the situation, the
more likely that everything will not happen as planned. Examples
include:
 The ﬁre is more severe than anticipated. This can occur when
there are unexpected types and quantities of fuels, and espe-
cially when ﬁres or explosions are intentional.
 Failures of ﬁre protection features. Fire protection features may
fail to perform as designed, as when a sprinkler system failure
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allows the ﬁre to grow unimpeded, a smoke control system
operates unreliably, or penetrations in barriers allow smoke to
spread to other areas in the building. Alarm and communication
systems can fail, delaying notiﬁcation of a ﬁre hazard and pre-
venting alerts and instructions from being transmitted or
intelligible.
 Organizational failures. Persons charged with key roles during a
ﬁre emergency may not remember procedural details and re-
sponsibilities, may be absent without an available deputy, or
replacements may not have been appointed.
 Capabilities of building occupants are not accurate or are un-
known. In many types of occupancies, the capabilities of build-
ing occupants are well understood. Families know the limita-
tions of their members. Health care facilities generally assume
low levels of capability among their patients. But in other oc-
cupancies, the presence of persons with limitations and their
locations are difﬁcult to assess. Hotels are unlikely have a clear
understanding of the capabilities of their guests. Ofﬁce build-
ings may maintain a register of persons who are likely to need
assistance, but even the most comprehensive registers will have
omissions due to temporary disabilities and the presence of
transients and visitors.
 Fire suppression operations may compromise areas that were
formerly safe. Fire ﬁghters sometimes begin their suppression
actions before all building occupants are moved to locations
where they can remain safe during the duration of a ﬁre
emergency. In particular, ﬁre suppression may be staged from
an exit stairs allowing smoke to enter, making the stairs
untenable.
 Complex systems interact in unpredictable ways. The components
of complex systems interact within the system and with the
environment in ways that are arguably impossible to predict
[24,,25]. Most incidents that result in unusually large losses
result from unforeseen (and perhaps unforeseeable) conver-
gences of multiple faults.
Due to all of the above uncertainties, it is important to assess
situations as they evolve—the topic of the next section on situation
awareness.
4.3. Maintaining good situation awareness
For all the decisions in the model, a dynamic assessment of
both the extent of the hazard and the locations and capabilities of
people is important. Situation awareness can be deﬁned as “the
degree that people responding to an emergency (1) are aware of
the situation in which they ﬁnd themselves, (2) understand the
meaning of the situation as it affects their abilities to pursue goals,
and (3) accurately anticipate how the situation is likely to change
as time passes” [26]. Good situation awareness means that occu-
pant movement managers monitor the extent of ﬁre hazards and
the locations of occupants who might require rescue or the im-
plementation of a backup strategy. The feedback process whereby
maintaining good situation awareness leads to modifying the oc-
cupant movement strategies is represented in Fig. 6. Occupant
movement managers periodically assess the likelihood that occu-
pant groups will remain separated from ﬁre hazards while they
remain in place, await rescue and move to safer locations. When
conditions appear to threaten occupants, then the decision model
is reapplied to understand if there are safer strategies.
Establishing good situation awareness involves collecting in-
formation. As a generalization, information can be obtained from
hardware devices and from people:
 Interpersonal communications. Communications between people
is of critical importance for obtaining good situation awareness
by persons managing occupant movement. Face-to-face and
two-way communication devices are invaluable for under-
standing the extent of ﬁre hazards and the locations and cap-
abilities of building occupants.
 Fire protection device interfaces. The most important hardware
device for obtaining situation awareness information is prob-
ably a ﬁre alarm panel or alarm annunciator panel. These panels
show the zone where a ﬁre detection device (for example, a
smoke detector) has been activated.6 Alarm panels may also
show the locations of ﬁre sprinkler, heat detector, and ductwork
damper activations. Sensor technologies increasingly integrated
with building information systems provide new capabilities and
are likely to become increasingly provide more detailed infor-
mation about conditions in buildings.
 Elevator system annunciator interfaces. Another type of annun-
ciator may provide valuable information about the status of
elevator cars—their locations and whether they are available for
service or can only be used by ﬁre ﬁghters. Protected EOE ele-
vators are required to provide this capability.
 Closed-circuit television systems (CCTV). CCTV has the potential
to provide valuable information to occupant movement man-
agers. Many large buildings have CCTV systems with cameras in
egress routes, including exit stairs and building exteriors, albeit
for the purposes of security and not the emergency movement
of occupants. These can provide useful information about
smoke conditions and the ﬂow of persons using egress routes.
In most instances, CCTV systems are monitored from security
stations that are separate from where ﬁre alarm systems are
monitored and ﬁre departments stage their efforts.
Fig. 6. Maintaining situation awareness to adapt the occupant movement plan.
6 Alarm panels are not an entirely reliable means to pinpoint the location of
ﬁres. Apart from false and nuisance alarms, it is important to note that buildings are
often “leaky” allowing the activation of smoke detectors at some distance from the
ﬁre.
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5. Conclusions: uses for the occupant movement management
decision model
Current research and development dealing with occupant
movement is dominated by computational models of egress times
(Section 1.4). Once a building is occupied, it seems unlikely that
the building owners and management would assume the costs of
examining various strategies using computational evacuation
models. The approach proposed in this paper relies on the abilities
of people to analyze and synthesize inputs based on a simple
heuristic decision model. People are notably effective at this task
given a mental model that is simple enough to easily recall
(especially if a person has trained in applying the model) and that
provides solutions of obvious relevance to their goals
For the most part, people charged with the responsibility of
moving people during building emergencies are the likely users of
the model. As noted earlier, code requirements and re-
commendations often specify the contents of ﬁre emergency
plans, but lack guidance about how to make decisions governing
which occupants should be located in which areas. The model is
intended to provide an easily understood heuristic and speciﬁes
the types of information that are needed to make those decisions.
Despite the focus on building managers, ﬁre protection en-
gineers and architects should ﬁnd the model to be of value for
several reasons.
 The model can guide the inclusion of design features that fa-
cilitate better strategies for protecting building occupants.
Building designers should understand the types of decisions
that need to be made during a ﬁre emergency, and include
building features that better facilitate improved decision mak-
ing during ﬁres and to ensure that designs are consistent with
the capabilities of occupants.
 To the extent that the people who manage the movement of
building occupants use the model, it should reduce the un-
certainty about how people are likely to behave during ﬁre
emergencies and enable occupants to make better use of the ﬁre
protection features designed into the building [27]. To the
extent that building design and the management of occupant
movement are harmonized, both the Required Safe Escape Time
(RSET) and uncertainties about how building occupants will
behave during ﬁres will be reduced. Reducing RSET and un-
certainties has the potential to increase the ﬂexibility in the
performance-based design of buildings [28].
 The model can be used by building designers to guide the
documentation that they should be providing to building
managers. Once the building is occupied, building managers
should understand the ﬁre protection features, and limitations,
of the building—especially as regards their decisions about
whether and where to move which people during a ﬁre
emergency.
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